OPUS RESTRUCTURING LLP (OC381479) — Risk Assessment

Basis of analysis: This assessment draws on the Companies House record and the filed accounts for the year ended 30 April 2023 (the most recent full financial statements included in the dataset). Financial data for FY2021, FY2024 and FY2025 is not present, so the quantitative picture is roughly three years old at the time of writing. Several older years (FY2016–FY2020) contain internally inconsistent figures — for example, FY2019 reports negative net assets of £216,837 alongside shareholders' funds of £1,494,443 — and should not be relied upon for trend work. Conclusions below are therefore drawn principally from FY2022 and FY2023.

1. Risk Rating

MEDIUM — with the caveat that for an unsecured creditor the effective risk sits closer to MEDIUM-HIGH.

The trading performance in FY2023 was exceptionally strong: turnover doubled to £10.3m, operating profit reached £4.7m, and cash rose from £138k to £1.49m. Filings are current and there is no evidence of distress. However, the balance sheet carries almost no capital cushion — net assets of £206k against £10.3m of turnover — working capital is tight (current ratio 1.03), the accounts are unaudited and now stale, and the entire designated-member cohort has changed since the last filed accounts without explanation in the available data. The business is profitable; the balance sheet is thin.

2. Key Concerns

a) Minimal capital adequacy and a structurally weak creditor position. Net assets at 30 April 2023 were £206,163 — approximately 2% of turnover. Net current assets were £100,625 against £3.31m of current liabilities (current ratio 1.03); excluding work-in-progress of £1.18m, the quick ratio falls to 0.67. Critically, note 10 discloses that members' balances "will rank equally with unsecured creditors" on a winding up. In practice this means the LLP has effectively no equity buffer standing ahead of third-party creditors: the capital is the members' own, and it can be withdrawn at their discretion. For a lender or trade counterparty, the loss-absorbing layer is close to nil.

b) Working capital quality and a large, unexplained creditor. Other creditors rose from £167,996 to £1,982,550 — a twelvefold increase in a single year — and now represent 60% of current liabilities. This may well be profit shares allocated to members but not yet drawn, which would be quasi-equity in substance; it could equally be deferred consideration, an acquisition balance, or tax timing. The composition is not disclosed and materially changes the interpretation of the balance sheet. Separately, £1.18m of "stock" is insolvency and restructuring case work-in-progress, whose carrying value depends on case completion and billing outcomes. Bank loans and overdrafts of £823,020 remain substantial, and it is notable that no interest payable is recorded in FY2023 (£1,484 in FY2022) despite that facility — a point worth clarifying.

c) Governance discontinuity and disclosure limitations. The FY2023 accounts were signed by five designated members (T Xxxxxxxname shown to subscribers, T Xxxxxxxname shown to subscribers, S Parker, J Xxxxxxxname shown to subscribers, C Xxxxxxxname shown to subscribers). None of these individuals appears in the current register of twenty LLP members, which lists an entirely different cohort. The registered office has also changed from Old Wolverton to 1 Radian Court, Knowlhill. Taken together this points to a substantial restructuring, merger or succession event that cannot be characterised from the available data. Alongside this, the accounts are unaudited (audit exemption claimed), a PSC statement is filed rather than named controlling persons, and Companies House categorises the entity as "Group" while the accounts are prepared under the small LLPs regime — implying subsidiary and participating-interest relationships that are not visible here.

3. Positive Indicators

• Strong and improving profitability. FY2023 operating profit of £4.70m on turnover of £10.33m (45.5% operating margin), with £2.79m available for discretionary division among members after associate-member remuneration of £1.91m. Even after all member costs, the underlying margin is a healthy c.27%.
• Marked recovery from a stressed FY2022. The prior year showed net current liabilities of £96,029, bank borrowings of £1.82m against cash of only £137,744, and £1.0m owed by members to the LLP. FY2023 reversed each of these: net current assets positive, bank debt more than halved, cash up tenfold, and members' balances restored to a creditor position of £206,163.
• Good cash conversion and receivables discipline. Cash of £1.49m covers bank borrowings 1.8 times. Trade debtor days are approximately 17, and trade creditor days approximately 15 — a tight, well-managed working capital cycle for a professional services firm.
• Compliance record is clean. Accounts and confirmation statement are both up to date with no overdue filings; the entity is Active and not in liquidation or administration. The last accounts (FY2025) and confirmation statement (January 2026) appear to have been filed on time.
• Sector positioning. Restructuring and insolvency work is counter-cyclical, and the FY2023 revenue doubling is consistent with elevated UK insolvency volumes. A twenty-member partnership with 70 employees spreads key-person and licensing risk across a broad practitioner base.

4. Due Diligence Notes

1. Obtain FY2024 and FY2025 accounts. The dataset stops at FY2023 despite later filings. Establish whether the FY2023 profit level was a cyclical peak or a new baseline, and whether the capital position has strengthened or been distributed away.
2. Deconstruct "other creditors" (£1.98m). Confirm the split between undistributed member profits, tax and social security, deferred consideration and any third-party obligations. This single line drives the solvency read.
3. Establish the nature of the 2023–2025 member and registered-office changes. Was this an orderly retirement and admission of new partners, a merger, a management buy-in, or a sale of the practice? Request the membership agreement, any novation or transfer documents, and confirmation that client engagements and regulatory authorisations transferred cleanly.
4. Map the group structure. Identify subsidiaries and participating interests behind the "Group" categorisation and the £1,367 owed to group undertakings; check for cross-guarantees or intra-group lending that could transmit risk.
5. Verify the basis of preparation. Reported turnover of £10.33m and average headcount of 70 sit at or above the small-company thresholds then in force (turnover £10.2m, 50 employees), with only the balance-sheet test comfortably met. The small LLPs regime treatment should be confirmed as appropriate rather than assumed to be an error.
6. Assess work-in-progress recoverability. Request an aged WIP schedule and a breakdown by case type and fee status; insolvency WIP can be sensitive to appointment volumes and to regulatory outcomes on individual cases.
7. Clarify the banking facility. Confirm committed versus on-demand lines, covenant terms, security granted, and why no interest cost appears in FY2023.
8. Regulatory and insurance standing. Confirm current authorisation of the licensed insolvency practitioners, professional indemnity cover limits, and bonding arrangements — an adverse regulatory event would be the principal non-financial threat to this business model.
9. Distribution policy. Given net assets of £206k, understand the members' drawdown policy and whether any capital-retention covenant or reserve exists.

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