CLI MANCHESTER LIMITED
Company number 06901790 · Monitor this company
This analysis was written by an AI from the company's public filings. It may contain errors or omissions and is not financial or professional advice.
Financial Health Assessment — CLI MANCHESTER LIMITED
Company No. 06901790 · Private Limited Company · Micro-entity · SIC 68100 (own real estate) / 82990 (business support) Based solely on publicly filed accounts data (FY2017–FY2026, year-end 31 May). Not professional advice.
1. Financial Health Score: C+ — "Out of intensive care, not yet fit for a marathon"
Why a C+ and not higher: The patient has survived a near-fatal episode. Equity collapsed from £388,361 (FY2020) to £19,108 (FY2024) — a 95% erosion — before staging a sharp £141,792 recovery in FY2026. Long-term debt has been almost entirely cleared (£169,740 at FY2020 → £779 at FY2026), working capital is positive again, and filings are fully up to date. Those are genuine signs of recovery.
Why not higher: The recovery is one year old, liquidity is thin (current ratio 1.16), two-thirds of the balance sheet is funded by creditors due within a year, and there is no profit-and-loss disclosure to confirm whether FY2026's gain is repeatable trading profit or a one-off. A patient with one good quarter of test results is "improving", not "well".
2. Key Vital Signs
| Vital Sign | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 | Clinical Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net assets (equity) | £19,108 | £20,594 | £162,386 | Strong rebound — but still 58% below the FY2020 peak of £388,361 |
| Equity / total assets | 8.9% | 8.0% | 33.3% | Improving; historically this ran at 40–59%, so still below the patient's own baseline |
| Current ratio | n/a | 0.98 | 1.16 | Thin. £1.16 of short-term assets per £1 of short-term debt — a narrow margin for error |
| Working capital | n/a | –£3,649 | +£52,620 | Returned to positive territory; the "pulse" has steadied |
| Long-term creditors (derived) | ~£54,900 | £28,782 | £779 | Effectively debt-free long term — the single biggest improvement |
| Total assets | £215,740 | £258,038 | £487,584 | +89% in one year — expansion, funded 62% by profit, 38% by new creditors |
| Fixed assets | n/a | £53,025 | £110,545 | £57,520 added — property/equipment investment |
| Employees | n/a | 2 | 3 | Modest operational growth |
| Compliance pulse | — | — | Accounts filed early (19 Oct 2026); confirmation statement current | No filing arrhythmia — a good sign of governance discipline |
The ten-year story in one line: a £225k-equity business that peaked at £388k in FY2020, lost £369k over four years (FY2021–FY2024), stabilised in FY2025, then added £142k in FY2026.
Important blind spot: micro-entity filleted accounts do not disclose cash, stock, debtors, turnover or profit. Cash was last reported at £9,526 (FY2023). The current ratio is therefore a proxy for liquidity, not a direct measurement. Of the £377,039 of current assets, we cannot see how much is genuinely liquid cash versus property stock or money owed by related parties.
3. Diagnosis
Primary condition: post-haemorrhage recovery, with residual fragility.
Symptom 1 — The four-year bleed (FY2021–FY2024). Equity fell £77k, £63k, £164k and £64k in successive years. Total assets also halved between FY2022 (£584,579) and FY2023 (£262,506), while short-term creditors fell £104k in the same year. That combination — assets down, debt down, equity down — is the classic signature of a property disposal at a loss, used to repay borrowing. This looks like a deliberate de-risking, not a trading collapse, but it cost the business most of its reserves.
Symptom 2 — Leverage has migrated from long-term to short-term. Long-term debt is now £779, but creditors due within one year are £324,419 — 66.7% of total assets. In plain terms, the company now funds itself on rolling short-term credit rather than a mortgage-style facility. That is cheaper and more flexible in good times, but it means the funding must be renewed constantly. If a lender or key creditor called in their money, the £52,620 of working capital headroom would not cover it. This is the single most important risk in the file.
Symptom 3 — A very large, unexplained profit. Equity rose £141,792 on a £487,584 asset base — a 29% return on assets. For a small property/support-services company, that is unusually high. It could be a genuine disposal gain, a revaluation-driven transaction, or a strong trading year. Without a P&L we cannot tell whether this is a cure or a painkiller. One good year does not establish a trend.
Symptom 4 — Thin capital base and concentration. Share capital is only £1,000; the entire £162,386 of equity is accumulated reserves. There is one director (name shown to subscribers) and one controlling shareholder (>75%). That is a serious key-person risk — the business's creditworthiness, relationships and know-how appear to sit with one individual.
Symptom 5 — Data hygiene. The PSC register shows name shown to subscribers at >75% alongside name shown to subscribers at 25–50% (mathematically incompatible unless separate share classes), and name shown to subscribers is listed twice. FY2022 also shows shareholders' funds of £392,190 against net assets of £247,690 — a £144,500 inconsistency. These may be filing/extraction artefacts, but they should be cleaned up: lenders and counterparties read these records.
Symptom 6 — Valuation opacity. Under FRS 105 the fixed assets of £110,545 are carried at cost less depreciation, with no revaluation permitted. The stated asset base may therefore be either understated or overstated relative to market value, and there is no impairment testing visible in the public file.
What is genuinely healthy: positive net assets, positive working capital, minimal long-term debt, no overdue filings, 17 years of trading history, and a business that has already demonstrated it can survive a severe shock and rebuild.
4. Prognosis
Base case (most likely): continued recovery, grade improving to B– within 2–3 years, provided FY2026's gain is repeatable and short-term creditors are rolled over as normal.
Key prognostic indicators to watch:
- FY2027 equity — if it holds above £150k, the recovery is real; if it slips back below £100k, FY2026 was an outlier.
- Current ratio — rising above 1.5 would move the grade to B; falling below 1.0 would be an early warning of relapse.
- The short-term creditor balance — any reduction in available credit would be an acute event.
- Cash disclosure — the sooner the company files accounts that reveal cash, the sooner the diagnosis firms up.
Risk factors that would worsen the outlook: concentration of current assets in a single debtor or in illiquid property stock; reliance on director loans within the £324,419; loss of the controlling director; or a repeat of the FY2021–FY2024 pattern of value extraction.
5. Recommendations
- Refinance or term out the short-term creditors. Converting even £100k of the £324k into a fixed-term facility would transform the risk profile and lift the current ratio towards 1.5. This is the highest-value single action available.
- Publish a fuller set of accounts, or at least prepare an internal cash flow statement. The absence of cash and profit data is the biggest obstacle to a confident diagnosis. Voluntary fuller disclosure would also improve credibility with lenders.
- Establish a liquidity buffer. Target cash equal to at least 8–12 weeks of outgoings. Last known cash (£9,526) was dangerously low for a business of this size.
- Stress-test the creditor base. Identify exactly what sits inside the £324,419 — trade creditors, director loans, tax, or bank overdraft. Director loans are the most flexible; tax arrears are the least. Know which is which.
- Address key-person risk. Document processes, consider key-person insurance, and clarify succession. A single-director company with £488k of assets should have a contingency plan on file.
- Clean the public record. Correct the duplicate/inconsistent PSC entries, resolve the FY2022 shareholders' funds discrepancy, and add a description of principal activity to the accounts (currently "No description of principal activity").
- Protect the recovery. Given the FY2021–FY2024 pattern, resist extracting reserves faster than they are rebuilt. Retain earnings until equity is back above £250k.